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Abstract
Uniform price auctions admit a continuum of collusive seeming equilibria due to bid-
dersmarket power. In this paper, I modify the auction rules in allowing the seller to
ration strategic bidders in order to ensure small biddersparticipation. I show that many
of these "bad" equilibria disappear when strategic bidders do not know small bidders
willingness to pay. Moreover, when the seller is unconstrained in the quantity she can
allocate to small bidders, the unique equilibrium price is the highest that the seller could
get.
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Strategic Price Discounting and Rationing in Uniform Price
Auctions
1 Introduction
Uniform price auctions are often criticized because they give rise to underpricing equilibria
due to biddersmarket power. This paper analyzes the existence of such equilibria when the
seller is allowed to ration strategic bidders in order to ensure small biddersparticipation. I
show that uncertainty about the small bidderswillingness to pay induces strategic bidders
to bid more aggressively, mitigating their market power. The main insight arising from this
nding is that price discounting associated with rationing prevents bidders from manipulating
uniform price auctions. This may explain why auctioneers in nancial auctions usually set
the o¤er price below the market clearing price without giving explicit rules.
The uniform price auction format is commonly used in nancial and electricity markets
to sell a divisible good. Following Milton Friedmans advice, the US Department of the
Treasury has even moved from a discriminatory to a uniform price auction to sell government
bonds. UK treasury also sells index-linked bonds using the same auction format. Uniform
price auctions are also used in California to buy electricity in the power exchange. They are
said to be superior to discriminatory auctions to allocate sulfur dioxide emissions permits.
More recently, Open IPO, a new, web-based underwriter has proposed to sell shares using a
uniform price auction1. The extensive use of this mechanism is due to the backing of leading
economists and policy makers, who have asserted that uniform price auctions are the most
e¢ cient multi-unit auction format. Their conclusions are based on the generalization of the
single-unit auctions literature to multi-unit auctions. However, as Ausubel and Cramton
(1998a) have shown2, the uniform price auction is not the generalization of the second price
auction to multi-unit auctions. Consequently, truthful bidding is not the optimal strategy,
1Google IPO is a recent example of a uniform price aution IPO underwrited by Open IPO.
2See also Ausubel and Cramton (1998b).
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and the bidders have an incentive to shade their bids3.
In a uniform price auction, bidders strategically submit demand schedules for a divisible
good and the price is set to equate supply and demand. Within this framework, Wilson
(1979)4 shows that there exist arbitrarily low equilibrium prices that may be sustained by
the bidders. The intuition for this nding is the following. As a bidder is only concerned
with his demand schedule at the market clearing price, the slope is not determined by the
equilibrium condition. This indetermination allows them to submit a rather inelastic demand
schedule which o¤sets other biddersincentives to bid more aggressively. They cannot a get a
larger share with only a modest price increase. Consequently, underpricing equilibria emerge.
Wilson (1979) was the rst to point that the indivisibility of the good is a critical as-
sumption in the revenue equivalence theorem for multi-unit auctions. Multi-unit auctions for
an indivisible and homogenous good have the same nice properties as single-unit auctions,
while share auctions (multi-unit auctions for a perfectly divisible good) have a multiplicity
of equilibria, some of which are ine¢ cient.
In practice, the rules of the uniform price auction are often modied. For instance, in the
Mise en Vente, an auction-like IPO used in France, the price does not clear the market and
pro-rata rationing is used. McDonald and Jacquillat (1974) analyze pricing in this process.
After all bids are submitted, the seller and the underwriter meet and set the o¤ering price
subject to the sellers preferred ownership structure which usually involves pro-rata rationing.
They provide empirical evidence that secondary market liquidity and ownership dispersion
are fundamental in determining the o¤ering price. This is also a rule used by Open IPO. One
can read on their classical prospectus, Depending on the outcome of negotiations between
the underwriters and us, the public o¤ering price may be lower, but will not be higher, than
the clearing price. The bids received in the auction and the resulting clearing price are the
principal factors used to determine the public o¤ering price of the stock that will be sold in
this o¤ering. The public o¤ering price may be lower than the clearing price depending on a
3See Binmore and Swierzbinski (2001) for a critical review about treasury auctions, and Martimort (2002)
for a survey about multi-unit auctions.
4The Wilsons (1979) result has been generalized by Back and Zender (1993), Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet
(2002) and Wang and Zender (2002).
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number of additional factors, including general market trends or conditions, the underwriters
assessment of our management, operating results, capital structure and business potential and
the demand and price of similar securities of comparable companies. The underwriters and
us may also agree to a public o¤ering price that is lower than the clearing price in order to
facilitate a wider distribution of the stock to be sold in the o¤ering.In a recent Open IPO
(RedEnvelope, Inc.), the pro-rata percentage for the entire o¤ering was approximately 56%5.
This is also the case in Treasury Auctions. Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2004)
document that the Finnish Treasury never chooses the supply that maximizes revenue given
the bids in an auction. They show that the quantity demanded but not awarded at the
o¤ering price averages 38.5% of the quantity awarded.
These discounts may be explained by regulatory constraints faced by the seller. Indeed,
she may have to sell a proportion of the shares to retail, uninformed, and non-strategic
bidders. For instance, when modelling Treasury Auctions, Back and Zender (1993) or Wang
and Zender (2002), among others, introduce a noncompetitive demand which has priority
over the competitive bids. Retail investors are also favoured in Initial Public O¤erings in
Singapore6 and in France7. In IPOs, the seller may also want to favour those small investors
in order to reduce the adverse selection problem characterized by Rock (1986)8. Another
interesting justication of rationing is given by Brennan and Franks (1997). They argue that
pre-IPO shareholders, who have private benets of control, have incentives to ration in order
to ensure oversubscription. Rationing raises the number of winning bidders in the IPO, and
thus reduces the block size of new shareholders. According to this control theory, rationing
is used to give shares to small investors who would not have access to the IPO otherwise.
This makes it more di¢ cult for new, larger investors to obtain control of the rm. Rationing
also creates a more di¤use investor base, making it more costly for investors to assemble large
5Another outstanding example is the Andover.nets IPO. When Andover.net decided to go public, the lead
underwriter, OpenIPO, found a market clearing price of $24 using the uniform price auction process and
decided to set an o¤er price of $18 in the registration statement. On the rst day Andover.net was traded on
the market, the shares closed at $77.50. See Boehmer and Fishe (2001) for more extensive comments about
this case.
6See Lee, Taylor and Walter (1999).
7See Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002).
8See Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) or Chen, Mak and Chan (2002).
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blocks of shares after the IPO. Indeed, even if they can acquire these shares on the secondary
market, this is not protable because if the market anticipates a change in ownership and
control, the stock price rises. This reduces the probability of owners being subject to the
monitoring of a larger shareholder or to a hostile takeover. Brennan and Franks (1997) nd
strong evidence that rationing tends to prevent the formation of large blocks of shares in
the hands of outside shareholders. Moreover, few hostile takeovers have taken place after
rationed IPOs, which is consistent with ownerswillingness to prevent a change in ownership
and control. Amihud, Hauser and Kirsh (2001) also support the hypothesis that rationing is
a way to increase ownership dispersion9.
To analyze the e¤ects of rationing against the biddersmarket power in such an envi-
ronment, I modify the uniform price auction rules in allowing the seller to favour small,
non-strategic, bidders in allocating them some quantity of the good even though she has
to discount the o¤er price to do so. Consequently, the seller strategically rations strategic
bidders in allocating them only a part of the quantity demanded. Moreover, small bidders
demand some quantity if and only if the nal price is low enough. However, the strategic
bidders do not know the small bidderswillingness to pay for one unit of the good10. The
degree of rationing is chosen by the seller in order to maximize the auction prots subject to
small biddersparticipation.
The main nding of this paper is that bidders have an incentive to bid more aggressively.
Equilibrium underpricing can be considerably reduced by allowing the seller to strategically
ration the quantity awarded to strategic bidders. This may help shed light on the common
use of this strategy in IPOs or treasury auctions without giving explicit rules.
The main idea behind this nding is that, due to the possibility of rationing, bidders are
9Another well-documented rationale for rationing is the willingness to sustain the liquidity of the sec-
ondary market trading. Boehmer and Fishe (2001) and Booth and Chua (1996) state that rationing ensures
oversubscription in IPOs and results in a greater dispersion of ownership which may improve liquidity in the
secondary market and therefore higher trading prots and brokerage commissions. See also Castellenos and
Oviedo (2003) and Roseboro (2002) for Treasury auctions or Cramton and Kerr (1999) for tradeable carbon
permit auctions.
10For instance, there is no explicit rule for discounting in the prospectus of IPOs underwrited by OpenIPO
or within the Mise en Vente process in France. Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2004) also note that the
Finnish Treasury did not have an explicit policy regarding neither the choice of quantity and stop-out price,
nor the quantity awarded to noncompetitive bidders.
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facing an uncertain residual supply. As they do not know the small bidderswillingness to pay
with certainty, the bidders are not only concerned with their demand at the market clearing
price but also with any price that could result from an ex-post rationing. This prevents them
from sustaining equilibrium prices as low as they would like. The bidders ability to inhibit
competition from their rivals is reduced. They cannot manipulate bidding as they did in the
Wilson (1979) model.
When small bidders can absorb the whole quantity, the previous e¤ects are enhanced.
The only resulting equilibrium price is the highest price that the seller could get. In this
case, bidders have no way to manipulate the uniform price auction.
These ndings may reconcile the uniform price auction theory with empirical evidence.
Indeed, natural experiments about the Treasury auctions are not in line with theoretical
predictions. Umlauf (1993) analyses the Mexican US Treasury auction and estimates that
the switch from discriminatory to uniform price auction has enhanced competition and has
reduced biddersprots. Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) nd that the change in revenue, due
to the same switch in the US, ranges from relatively small losses to moderate gains. Malvey
and Archibald (1998) observe that this switch produces small gains in revenue. Keloharju,
Nyborg and Rydqvist (2004) study Finnish Treasury auctions and show that underpricing is
low, and is not due, as suggested by the theory, to the exercise of monopsonist market power
by the bidders. The same evidence comes from the IPO literature. Indeed, Derrien and
Womack (2000) prove that the auctioning mechanism leads to less underpricing than book
building or xed price methods. Kandel, Sarig and Wohl (1999) indicate that underpricing
in Israeli uniform price IPO auctions is signicant but small compared to what happens with
other mechanisms. This gap is due to the fact that, in theory, there is no strategic role for the
seller in uniform price auctions. However, in the real world, the seller is not passive and may
take action to mitigate biddersability to exercise their market power, as in this analysis.
The seminal contribution by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) is one of the rst papers to
select among the continuum of equilibria of the uniform price auction. Klemperer and Meyer
(1989) introduce uncertainty about the supplied quantity and search for ex-post optimal
6
supply function equilibria. They prove that the set of equilibria is signicantly reduced
when uncertainty is unbounded. The intuition is that the biddersdemand schedules have to
be dened not only at the market clearing price, but also around it. Despite this promising
result, Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2002) in the risk averse case, show that
arbitrarily low equilibrium prices always exist in the case of uniform price treasury auctions
when supply is perfectly inelastic but subject to a horizontal shock. In this paper, I show
that allowing the seller to ration bidders ex-post reduces the set of equilibria even though
small bidders cannot absorb the whole issue (this is equivalent to a bounded uncertainty in
their papers). Moreover, within a perfectly inelastic supply framework, I prove that there is
a unique equilibrium in which the realized price is as high as possible when small bidders can
absorb the whole quantity (uncertainty is unbounded).
This paper is also related to a growing literature on the ways to mitigate biddersmarket
power in uniform price auctions. For instance, McAdams (2002) and Back and Zender (2001)
show that, when sellers have the possibility to adjust the quantity put for sale ex-post,
bidders cannot sustain all equilibrium prices as before, and then underpricing is signicantly
reduced. The economic sense of this nding is that when the seller can adjust the supply
ex-post, bidders are not only concerned with the market clearing price that would occur
without possibility of adjustment, but also with any price that could result from an ex-post
adjustment. McAdams (2002) also proves that collusive seemingequilibria disappear when
some amount of cash is shared between rationed bidders. This encourages aggressive bidding
for marginal units and thus raises the equilibrium price. LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) study
uniform price auctions when the seller is strategic and can precommit to an increasing supply
schedule. They prove that even if underpricing is still present, it is signicantly reduced. In
this setting of increasing supply, with a little price increase the residual supply increases a lot
and bidders get a greater quantity. This reduces each bidders market power. Consequently,
bidders bid more aggressively and low price equilibria are eliminated. My paper deviates
from theirs in several respects. First, instead of adjustable supply my model considers price
discounting associated with rationing as a way to reduce the ability of bidders to manipulate
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uniform price auctions. As discounting is a widely used strategy in nancial auctions, it is
interesting to understand what happens within this framework. Second, I make in this paper
a complete characterization of equilibria without assuming that small bidders can absorb the
whole quantity11. This makes the model closer to real-life situations in which one cannot
adjust the quantity put for sale optimally. I also show that the McAdams(2002) results can
be found as a limiting case of mine when the bidderscapacity goes to the total quantity.
Finally, under these modied rules bidders still pay the same per-unit price, whereas this is
not the case when the seller divides a cash prize among bidders. As the seller rst decides to
sell the good using a uniform price auction, this may be a real concern.
However, adjusting the supply schedule is not the only way to boost competition in
uniform price auctions. Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) and (2004b) show that allowing a nite
number of bids is also a good way to eliminate bad equilibria. Their results, however, are
proved in a framework in which bidders are allowed to submit discrete bids, whereas I consider
a share auction.
Rationing in IPOs has also been studied by Parlour and Rajan (2005) in a model of book
building. Following Sherman (2001), they model the Book Building process as a multi-unit
common value auction and use the symmetric equilibrium characterized by Milgrom (1981).
They show that rationing mitigates winners curse, i.e., bidders bid more aggressively12. They
also determine the optimal degree of rationing in the class of credible mechanism13. However,
a critical assumption in their model is that the bidders have unit demand. I, in contrast,
consider bidders who have multi-unit demand, an assumption which is necessary in most of
the real-life applications of uniform price auction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, I present
11This is equivalent to relax the assumption that the seller can innitely adjust the quantity put for sale in
their models.
12See Bulow and Klemperer (2002) to understand how rationing may raise the expected prices when common
value objects are sold. This model is more complex than the Bulow and Klemperers (2002) one, but the
intuition is the same.
13A credible mechanism is a mechanism in which the seller use the announced pricing rule. Here, it means
that the seller uses the rationing rule and dont always set the IPO price equal to the market clearing strategy.
Such a deviation from the seller is not credible in the sense that bidders would predict it and would bid
according to it.
8
the Wilson (1979) and Back and Zenders (1993) model and results. In section 4, I solve
the model with rationing and compare the results with the McAdams(2002) ones. Finally,
section 5 concludes and all proofs are provided in section 6.
2 The model
In this section, I develop a model of the uniform price auction, along the lines of Wilson
(1979) or Back and Zender (1993).
A seller wants to auction a xed quantity, Q, of a homogenous and perfectly divisible
good using a uniform price auction. The market is formed by N strategic, rational and
risk neutral agents (bidders) and by small, retail and non-strategic bidders. The maximum
quantity small bidders can collectively get is Q  Q; i.e. they cannot absorb the whole issue.
Moreover, their willingness to pay for one unit of the good is p0: All strategic bidders share
the same information about the per unit common value of the good, v. However, they only
know that the small bidderswillingness to pay for the good, p0; is distributed on the interval
[0; v] with cdf F (:)14.
Bidders compete in the auction in simultaneously submitting piecewise continuously dif-
ferentiable demand schedules for the divisible good. Let X(p) =
NP
i=1
xi(p) be the aggregate
demand for the shares at price p: X(p) is also piecewise continuously di¤erentiable.
I modify Wilsons (1979) basic model of the uniform price auction in allowing the seller
to favour small, non-strategic, bidders in allocating them some quantity even though she has
to discount the o¤er price to do so. Consequently, the seller strategically rations strategic
bidders in allocating them only a part of the quantity demanded. This degree of rationing
is chosen by the seller in order to maximize the auction prots subject to small bidders
participation.
14For instance, there is no explicit rule for discounting in the prospectus of IPOs underwrited by OpenIPO
or within the Mise en Vente process in France. Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2004) also note that the
Finnish Treasury did not have an explicit policy regarding neither the choice of quantity and stop-out price,
nor the quantity awarded to noncompetitive bidders.
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The seller selects an o¤er price p(); lower than the market clearing price, at which
strategic bidders only receive a fraction  of the total quantity of good. Here,  = 1 corre-
sponds to a case in which strategic bidders get all the quantity. When she selects a degree of
rationing  < 1; only a part of the total quantity is awarded to strategic bidders.
Moreover, it is assumed that bidders are perfectly symmetric15.
According to these assumptions, the objective of the seller, when using degree of rationing
; is
W () = p()Q
s:t:
8><>: p()  p0(1  )Q  Q
where Q is the number of shares put up for sale, p() is the market clearing price when
the degree of rationing is ; Q is the maximum quantity small bidders can collectively get
and p0 is the small bidderswillingness to pay for one unit of the good, distributed on [0; v]
with c.d.f. F (:).
The constraints in the sellers objective corresponds respectively to the small bidders
participation and capacity constraints.
The equilibrium price is now dened as16:
p() = maxfp j X(p) = Q; p  0g (1)
where  2 [0; 1] is the degree of rationing chosen by the seller after having observed the
aggregate demand.
The strategic bidders being risk neutral, their program is to choose a demand schedule
which maximizes their expected prot under the market clearing condition, the expectation
15The model is developed only to handle the perfectly symmetric case. However, Bourjade (2007) has
extended my results to the asymmetric case. Bourjade (2007) shows that my results in the perfectly symmetric
case are still true and even enhanced when there are m types of bidders characterized by their (low enough)
private costs of acquisition of the shares.
16This specication assumes that the sellers reserve price is zero.
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being with respect to :
I focus on symmetric ex-post optimal Nash equilibria in pure strategies, i.e. if a strategic
bidder expects other bidders to submit their equilibrium strategy, his best response is also
the equilibrium strategy. Moreover, given other biddersbid schedules, for each realization
of the degree of rationing, ; strategic bidders would not change their bids even though they
were allowed to do so ex-post.
The timing of the game is the following
1. The seller announces that, depending on the small bidderswillingness to pay, she can
ration the strategic bidders:
2. Each strategic bidder i simultaneously submit a piecewise continuously di¤erentiable
demand schedule.
3. After observing the aggregate demand, the seller chooses a degree of rationing,  2 [0; 1]
according to his objective.
4. The seller sets the equilibrium price p which can be lower than the market clearing
price without rationing:
5. Shares are allocated.
3 Equilibria of the basic uniform price auction
I rst study the equilibria of the uniform price auction without rationing. This framework
was rst examined by Wilson (1979) and generalized by Back and Zender (1993).
In this basic model of the uniform price auction, the price is set to equate supply and
demand. This comes down to taking  = 1 in (1):
Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993) show that the bidders can sustain arbitrarily
low equilibrium prices. The main idea behind this result is that a bidder only cares about his
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demand schedule at the market clearing price. As the slope of this demand schedule is not
determined by the equilibrium condition, he may submit a rather inelastic demand schedule.
The value of the slope acts as an implicit veto if a bidder tries to increase his market share.
This o¤sets other biddersincentives to bid more aggressively. A substantial price increase is
required to get a larger share. Consequently, underpricing equilibria emerge.
These results can be summarized in the following proposition from Back and Zender
(1993) extended by Kremer and Nyborg (2004b):
Proposition 1 (Back and Zender (1993) modied) Bidders can sustain any equilibrium
price bp in the range [0; v] in submitting the following bidding strategy,
d(p) =

v   p
v   bp
 1
N 1
;
and the stop out price is bp:
There is a multiplicity of equilibria in the uniform price auction, indexed by the slope of
the demand schedule. Only the Bertrand equilibrium price v could achieve the rst best.
Selling a divisible good using a uniform price auction is therefore risky. This is not in line
with the conclusions of Friedman, who predicted that uniform price auctions have the same
nice propertiesas Dutch auctions, i.e. truthful bidding is the best strategy.
To cope with the multiplicity of equilibria, Back and Zender (1993), followed by Kremer
and Nyborg (2004b), introduce supply uncertainty17. They show that, under supply uncer-
tainty, the previous equilibria are the only ones in the class of ex-post optimal equilibria18,
but arbitrary low equilibrium prices can still be sustained by the bidders.
The main conclusion of their studies is that supply uncertainty does not allow one to
select among these equilibria as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) when the supply is perfectly
inelastic.
17This methodology to select among all equilibria is due to Klemperer and Meyer (1989).
18 It means that bidders would not change their bids even though they were allowed to do it ex post.
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4 Equilibria of the uniform price auction with rationing
In this section, due to the sellers objective, strategic bidders anticipate that the equilibrium
is lower than p0; the small bidderswillingness to pay for the good. However as they do
not know the distribution of p0; they are not able to determine the degree of rationing that
maximizes the prots from the auction. However, they know that for each value of p0; there
is an optimal degree of rationing that maximizes the sellers objective. Indeed, if p() is
strictly decreasing19, this optimal degree of rationing is unique for each value of p0.
The bidders being risk neutral, their program is to choose a demand schedule, xi(p);
which maximizes their prot under the market clearing condition:
Let us remark that, within this framework, low equilibrium prices do not necessarily result
from biddersmarket power, because the seller is constrained to allocate a positive quantity
to small bidders. A low equilibrium price may thus be due to a low willingness to pay of
small bidders.
An ex-post optimal symmetric Nash equilibrium of this game is characterized by demand
schedules fxi(:)gi=1;:::;N and an equilibrium price p() that equalize the aggregate demand
for shares and the supplied quantity when the degree of rationing is .
The equilibrium price is dened by (1) where  is the degree of rationing maximizing
the sellers objective under the small biddersparticipation and capacity constraints, i.e. the
o¤er price p() has to be lower than p0 and small bidders have to be able to absorb the
quanty awarded by the seller.
Let us remark that, given ; this price is uniquely dened when the aggregate demand is
non increasing. The quantity xi(p()) is awarded to bidder i:
Let us denote X i the aggregate demand of all bidders but i20:
Now, consider the bidder i0s program. Ex-post optimality implies that the quantity
xi(p
()) = Q X i(p()) and the price p() that emerges when the degree of rationing
is  maximize the revenue of bidder i given X i(:) and : This amounts to p() being the
19This is proved in the Appendix.
20As bidders are perfectly symmetric, in equilibrium I have X i(:) = (N   1)x(p):
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solution of the program
p() 2 argmax
p
f(v   p) [Q X i(p)]g
The rst order condition of this program is
 Q+X i(p)  (v   p)X 0 i(p) = 0 (2)
If second order conditions are satised (this is checked in the appendix), then (2) im-
plicitly determines p() for each realization of : The quantity awarded to bidder i is
[Q X i(p())] :
Moreover, if p() is strictly decreasing, the quantity awarded to bidder i can be written
as a function from price to quantity. This implies that xi(p) intersects i0s residual supply
once and only once for each  at p(): So, by submitting xi(p), bidder i can achieve ex-post
optimal adjustment to the degree of rationing. Thus, bidder i0s best response to X i(p)
consists in submitting the demand schedule xi(p):
The following proposition characterizes the pure strategy ex-post optimal symmetric equi-
librium of this game.
Proposition 2 Assume that the seller can ration the quantity awarded to strategic bidders
after having observed bids. Then, the equilibrium demand schedule of a strategic bidder is
x(p) =
Q
N

v   p
v   p(1)
 1
N 1
where p(1) 2 [0; p0] is the equilibrium price when there is no rationing ex-post. Moreover,
the stop-out price is:
p = min
(
p0; v  

1  Q
Q
N 1
[v   p(1)]
)
When the number of bidders, N; goes to innity, there is a unique equilibrium, p = p0:
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Finally, the degree of rationing selected by the seller is
(p0) = max
(
v   p0
v   p(1)
 1
N 1
;

1  Q
Q
)
Let us rst note that p(1) completely determines the equilibrium price. For each value
of p(1); there is an equilibrium of the uniform price auction. The equilibrium price that
can be sustained by the strategic bidders is therefore not unique. However, the equilibrium
demand schedules characterized in Proposition 2 are unique in the class of the pure strategy
ex-post optimal symmetric equilibria.
Due to the previous proposition the equilibrium price is
p =
8><>: p0 if p0  v  
h
1  QQ
iN 1
[v   p(1)]
v  
h
1  QQ
iN 1
[v   p(1)] if p0 > v  
h
1  QQ
iN 1
[v   p(1)]
More specically, if:
p(1)  v   [v   p0]h
1  QQ
iN 1 ;
the equilibrium price of the uniform price auction is p0; the willingness to pay for one
unit of the good of small bidders.
However, when:
p(1) < v   [v   p0]h
1  QQ
iN 1 ;
the equilibrium price is v  
h
1  QQ
iN 1
[v   p(1)].
In this case, strategic bidders are able to exercise their market power and the small
biddersparticipation constraint is not bounded as the equilibrium price is lower than p0.
This is due to the fact that small bidders are capacity constrained. Indeed, there exists some
p0 for which the optimal degree of rationing would require a capacity higher than Q: The
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seller is therefore constrained to set a lower stop-out price in order to sell the total quantity.
The worst equilibrium price for the seller is then p = v

1 
h
1  QQ
iN 1
; i.e. with
p(1) = 0: Assuming that the willingness to pay for one unit of the good of small bidders, p0;
is high enough, i.e. p0  v

1 
h
1  QQ
iN 1
; p is thus the lowest equilibrium price that
could be sustained by strategic bidders in exercising their market power.
When the seller strategically uses rationing, strategic bidders cannot sustain arbitrary
low equilibrium prices. The collusive seemingequilibria, introduced by Wilson (1979) and
Back and Zender (1993), are therefore very sensitive to the possibility of ex-post rationing.
Moreover, when the seller is not constrained in the quantity she can allocate to small
bidders (Q), the lower bound for the equilibrium prices is raised and the set of equilibrium
prices is restricted.
Let us also note that there is a benet in raising the number of bidders in this modied
uniform price auction, whereas this was not the case under the conditions of Proposition 1.
This model with rationing is in the same vein as that of Back and Zender (2001) and
McAdams (2002). However, it is designed to better correspond to the real world. Rationing
is used instead of random supply as an alternative way to ght collusive-like equilibria in
uniform price auctions. I also relax the assumption that the seller can innitely increase, or
decrease, the supply of shares in order to more accurately reect many real-life situations,
in which quantity put for sale cannot be adjusted optimally. Indeed, in IPOs there is a
maximum amount of proceeds a seller can obtain which is determined before the IPO begins,
and in treasury or electricity auctions, there are feasibility constraints on the supply.
However, it is interesting to study what happens when the equivalent assumption is added
in my model, i.e. small bidders can absorb the whole issue, i.e. Q = Q: Even though this
corollary has a limited practical relevance, it allows one to compare the results with those of
McAdams(2002).
Corollary 3 If small bidders can absorb the whole quantity, the only equilibrium price is
p = p0:
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This result is in line with McAdams (2002) analysis. McAdams shows that when the
seller can innitely increase the supply21 after having observed the bids schedules, no collusive
seeming equilibria exist. This McAdams(2002) result is therefore a limiting result of ours
when Q goes to Q22. Intuitively, in McAdamsframework, if the seller innitely increases
the supply, biddersability to exercise their market power is reduced and their advantage of
being strategic disappears. This is similar of what happens in my model with Q = Q; as the
seller can then allocate all the quantity to small bidders when the price sustained by strategic
bidders is too low. This prevents them to exercise their market power. The equilibrium price
is therefore the highest price the seller could get, i.e. the willingness to pay for one unit of
the good of small bidders, p0: Rationing is therefore as e¢ cient as variable-supply to reduce
biddersability to exercise their market power.
These ndings may explain why the auctioneer in nancial auctions usually sets the
o¤er price below the market clearing price without giving explicit rules. Indeed, as she has
incentives to ration, she must ration in an uncertain enough way23 in order to reduce bidders
ability to exercise their market power. This allows her to select the optimal price discount,
not subject to manipulation from bidders. However, let us remark that even though these
new rules are not completely transparent, the distribution of shares is not chosen by the
seller. The winners are the bidders who make the highest bids. This makes the modied
uniform price auction a fairer IPO process than book building, as it maintains the uniform
auction pricing rule that all winners pay the same price.
Moreover, this contribution may reconcile economists with uniform price auctions. Indeed,
the unique ex-post optimal equilibrium of this modied uniform price auction is the e¢ cient
one. Each bidder bids for the maximum quantity he could absorb at any price below the
price at which he makes zero prot and the resulting equilibrium price is the true value of
the shares. This is exactly the same equilibrium that Back and Zender (1993) identify for
21 In fact, the auctionner can increase the demand in McAdams (2002), because this is a model about
electricity procurement.
22 In this paper, McAdams also shows that "collusive-seeming" equilibria disappear when some amount of
cash is shared between rationed bidders.
23The seller should not reveal the willingness to pay for one unit of the good of small bidders to strategic
bidders.
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discriminatory auctions with uncertainty. Therefore, these two auctioning processes result in
the same equilibrium and yield the same revenue to the seller.
5 Conclusion
A large part of the literature supports the use of discriminatory auctions when selling a
divisible good because of the collusive seeming equilibria of the uniform price auctions.
Recent contributions have shown that adjusting supply after observing bids eliminates some
of these equilibria. This analysis introduces a new way for the seller to reduce biddersmarket
power, commonly used in IPOs: rationing shares. This reduces the biddersmarket power
and thus eliminates many of these bad equilibria.
When rationing is allowed, the only surviving equilibria are close to the Bertrand-type
one. Moreover, when the seller can allocate all the quantity to small bidders, the previous
e¤ects are enhanced. This results in a unique surviving equilibrium price which is the highest
price the seller could obtain.
These ndings may shed light on the reasons why the auctioneer in nancial auctions
usually sets the o¤er price below the market clearing price without giving explicit rules. She
is induced to ration in an uncertain enough way in order to reduce biddersability to exercise
their market power. Moreover, this may attract bidders, with high entry costs enhancing the
competition from current bidders24. Even though these rules lack transparency, all winners
pay the same price and are the highest bidders, whereas this is not the case in many other
IPO processes and auction formats.
Rationing is thus a response to the main criticism of uniform price auctions, namely
the exercise of market power by strategic bidders. Small modications to the rules elimi-
nate collusive seemingequilibria. Rationing helps the seller to reduce the biddersmarket
power and consequently their ability to manipulate the uniform price auction. Moreover, the
equilibria of the Wilson continuous share auction model with rationing and the equilibria
24See Bourjade (2007).
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of the discrete model are almost identical. Using these modications may thus make this
more tractable model a good approximation of Treasury or electricity markets, thus enabling
better comparisons with discriminatory auctions.
An interesting extension could be to solve a dynamic version of this model. Indeed, one
way a seller can make her rationing strategy credible is to develop a reputation for rationing.
An important feature of IPO, treasury, electricity or pollution permit auctions is that they are
repeated frequently. The seller can use the previous auctions to make rationing credible. If
the seller randomly rations shares in an auction, bidders may believe that she will play in the
same way in the next auction. This makes them build prior beliefs about the rationing scheme
used by the seller, anticipating that the degree of rationing used by the seller is distributed
over some non-empty support. Bidders would therefore be induced to use the same strategy
that we present in this paper. Moreover, if the seller does not ration at all, bidders anticipate
it and use the same collusive seemingstrategy as in Back and Zender (1993). Then, even
though the seller is only prot maximizing but is nevertheless interested in his long-term
prots, rationing should be optimal in order to build a rationingreputation and then make
prots in the subsequent auctions. However, the viability of sustaining a reputation to play
a mixed strategy is still an open question.
Another extension would be to introduce a private component to the value of the good
for each bidder. This would introduce private information into the model. However, the
characterization of the equilibria of the uniform price auction with private information is not
an easy task. These issues are left for future research.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Q be the maximum quantity small bidders can absorb, Q
the quantity of shares put up for sale, N the total number of risk neutral strategic bidders,
xi(p) an equilibrium strategy (piecewise continuously di¤erentiable),  the rationing scheme
and p0 the small bidderswillingness to pay for one unit of the good.
As the seller maximizes the prots from the auction, she prefers to set  such that the
corresponding equilibrium price is as high as possible. Thus, as long as it is feasible25, she
will set the stop out price equals to p0:
As strategic bidders do not know the distribution of p0; they are not able to determine
the degree of rationing, ; that maximizes the prots from the auction. However, they know
that for each value of p0; there is an optimal degree of rationing that maximizes those prots.
Indeed, if p() is strictly decreasing26, this optimal degree of rationing is unique for each
value of p0.
Let us denote X i the aggregate demand of all strategic bidders but i: Given the demand
X i; and the degree of rationing ; the price p() maximizes strategic bidder is prot.
I solve for the Nash equilibrium of this game. Let us rst consider the bidder i0s program.
As I characterize the pure strategy symmetric equilibrium of this game, all strategic
bidders use the same equilibrium strategy, i.e., xi(p) = x(p); and X i(p) = (N   1)x(p); for
i = 1; :::; N:
The market clearing price is then chosen such that Nx(p) = (p0)Q: Where (p0) is the
degree of rationing selected by the seller if the small bidderswillingness to pay for one unit
of the good is p0. In order to avoid a multiplicity of notations, let me call this degree of
rationing :
Bidder i wants to sustain a price p() when the degree of rationing is ; in submitting
25First, the market clearing condition has to be satised. Then, when setting the stop-out price, the seller
has to take into account small bidderscapacity. Indeed, it may exists some p0 for which the optimal degree af
rationing would require a capacity higher than Q: In this case, the seller is constrained to set a lower stop-out
price in order to sell the total quantity.
26This is proved later.
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a demand schedule xi(p): Ex-post optimality gives the following program for bidder i
p() 2 argmax
p
f(v   p) [Q  (N   1)x(p)]g
where [Q  (N   1)x(p)] is the residual supply that bidder i faces.
Bidder is objective is to maximize his prots with respect to the price p: I obtain the
following rst order condition27
 Q+ (N   1)x(p())  (N   1)(v   p())x0(p()) = 0 (3)
However, in a symmetric equilibrium, the market clearing condition must be satised
Nx(p()) = Q (4)
The derivative of the market clearing condition with respect to  gives
N
dp()
d
x0(p()) = Q (5)
Putting this into the rst order condition (3) gives
 Q+ (N   1)
N
Q  (N   1)
N
(v   p())
dp()
d
Q = 0
dp()
d
  (N   1)p
()

+ (N   1) v

= 0
A particular solution of this di¤erential equation is p() = v:
We have to solve the homogenous equation which is
dp()
d
p()
=
N   1

() p() = kN 1
27Second order conditions are satised, see the Lemma in the Appendix.
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Hence, the general solution of this di¤erential equation is
p() = kN 1 + v (6)
where k = p(1)  v; with p(1) 2 [0; p0] is the equilibrium price with no rationing28.
If the small bidders can absorb the quantity awarded by the seller, the equilibrium price
is p0 and the optimal degree of rationing selected by the seller is
(p0) =

v   p0
v   p(1)
 1
N 1
Moreover, one can remark that p(:) is decreasing in  which implies that the equilibrium
is ex-post optimal.
This remark together with the small bidderscapacity constraint (1  )  Q; or equiva-
lently  
h
1  QQ
i
; implies that this equilibrium only holds when
p0  v  

1  Q
Q
N 1
[v   p(1)]
Otherwise, the optimal degree of rationing is  =
h
1  QQ
i
and the equilibrium price p =
v  
h
1  QQ
iN 1
[v   p(1)] : This means that the equilibrium price is completely determined
when the value of p(1) is given.
Moreover,in this case, i.e. if the willingness to pay for one unit of the good of small
bidders, p0; is high enough, the lowest equilibrium price that could be sustained by strategic
bidders in exercising their market power is the one with p(1) = 0; i.e.
p = v
 
1 

1  Q
Q
N 1!
:
This condition signicantly reduces the set of equilibrium prices, even though it is not
unique. For each value of p(1) 2 [0; p0] ; we can associate a price schedule p(); and
28p(1) has to be lower than p0 in order to ensure small biddersparticipation.
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consequently the demand schedule, x(p).
Indeed, using (6), we obtain
dp()
d
= (p(1)  v) (N   1)N 2
Putting this in (5) gives
x0(p()) =
Q
(p(1)  v)N(N   1)N 2 (7)
One could also rewrite (3), together with (4), as
x(p) =  (N   1)(v   p)x0(p)
This gives, with (7), for all p 2 ]0; p(1)[
x(p) =
Q
(v   p(1))NN 2 (v   p) (8)
Moreover, inverting p(:) in (6)29, together with (8) gives:
x(p) =
Q
N (v   p(1))

v   p(1)
v   p
N 2
N 1
(v   p)
Finally, we obtain the equilibrium demand schedule for all p 2 ]0; p(1)[
x(p) =
Q
N

v   p
v   p(1)
 1
N 1
(9)
Moreover,when N goes to innity, the lower bound of the equilibrium prices goes to v:
However, let me remind that the seller has to ensure small biddersparticipation. This implies
that whatever the degree of rationing in equilibrium, the equilibrium price goes to p0 when
N goes to innity.
29p(:) is strictly increasing and, thus, invertible.
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It means that when the number of strategic bidders is large enough, the equilibrium price
is the highest price that the seller could get:
Lemma 4 The demand schedule x(:) forms a symmetric Demand Function Equilibrium
tracing through ex-post optimal points if and only if for all p  0; x(:) satises the rst
order condition of the problem (3) together with the Market Clearing condition (4) and is non
increasing.
Proof.
 Su¢ ciency:
Since x(:) is non increasing, the aggregate demand intersects the xed supply at a unique
point for each :
Moreover, the demand schedules satisfy the rst order condition for ex-post prot maxi-
mization when the other rms choose the/an equilibrium strategy.
Both conditions together imply that 
00
i < 0 for all p
():
Indeed, the rst order condition of bidder i0s problem is
 Q+ (N   1)x(p())
 (N   1)(v   p())x0(p()) = 0
Putting the market clearing condition in the previous equation gives
x(p()) =  (v   p())(N   1)x0(p())
We now make the derivative of this equation with respect to the price
x
0
(p()) = (N   1)x0(p())  (v   p())(N   1)x00(p())
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Or equivalently
(N   2)x0(p()) = (v   p())(N   1)x
00
(p())
Let us state the second order condition of bidder i

00
i (p
()) = (N   1)x0(p()) + (N   1)x0(p())
 (v   p())(N   1)x00(p())
Those conditions together give

00
i (p
()) = 2(N   1)x0(p())  (N   2)x0(p()) (10)
= Nx
0
(p())
This is clearly non positive when the demand schedule x(:) is non increasing.
Global second order conditions for ex-post prot maximization are satised everywhere.
Thus, the demand schedules form a symmetric Demand Function Equilibrium tracing
through ex-post optimal points.
 Necessity:
Satisfaction of the rst order condition of the problem together with the market Clearing
condition is a necessary condition for a supply function to trace through ex-post optimal
points.
Moreover, if for some p(); x0(p())  0; then 00(p())  0; see (10).
Therefore, the demand schedules x(:) cannot be a symmetric DemandFunction Equi-
librium.
Proof of Corollary 3. In the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain the following equilibrium
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demand schedule for all p 2 ]0; p(1)[
x(p) =
Q
N

v   p
v   p(1)
 1
N 1
; with 0  p(1)  p0:
Moreover, the equilibrium price is
p = min
(
p0; v  

1  Q
Q
N 1
[v   p(1)]
)
;
I have shown that the minimum value for the right hand side is v

1 
h
1  QQ
iN 1
:When
Q goes to Q; this value goes to v and the equilibrium price becomes:
p = p0;
which is the highest price the seller could get.
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